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Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way
To Pierce Bank Secrecy
James .K. Knapp*
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 1978, computer genius Stanley Mark Rifkin was indicted
in Los Angeles, California, for obtaining a transfer code number for an
account at the Pacific National Bank in Los Angeles and using it to cause
a wire transfer of $10 million to his Swiss bank account.1 Shortly before
the trial, the judge suppressed Rifkin's statements and the millions of
dollars worth of diamonds he purchased with the loot. If the suppression
of evidence had occurred one to two years previously, the United States
would have been out of court on the most significant counts in the case.
But due to the fact that a mutual legal assistance treaty had entered into
force with Switzerland in 1977, the United States was able to obtain au-
thenticated copies of the Swiss bank records concerning the wire trans-
fers as well as Swiss depositions on the authenticity of those records.
Bank secrecy had been pierced! Rifkin decided to plead guilty and re-
ceived an eight year prison sentence. Credit for the conviction goes to
the existence of the mutual legal assistance treaty with Switzerland
("Swiss Treaty").2
A mutual legal assistance treaty is a treaty which creates a binding
obligation on the treaty partners to render assistance to each other in
criminal investigations and proceedings. It is a treaty which typically
provides for the direct exchange of information between two "central au-
thorities"-the U.S. Department of Justice and its foreign counterpart,
bypassing both normal diplomatic channels and the involvement of a
U.S., though not always a foreign, court in the making of a request. The
first such treaty went into effect with Switzerland only ten years ago, yet
this new type of treaty is becoming the most effective means of piercing
* James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, U.S. Department of
Justice (since January 1988). Formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, in
which capacity he led the Department's delegation in the negotiation of the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties with the Bahamas and Thailand. A.B. Harvard University, 1964; J.D. University of Colo-
rado, 1967. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the U.S. Government or the Department of Justice.
1 United States v. Rifkin, No. Cr. 78-1050-WMB (C.D. Cal., indictment filed Nov. 15, 1978).
2 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, United States-Switzerland, May 25, 1973,
27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss Treaty].
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the veil of foreign bank secrecy laws for the purpose of combating the
laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking and other serious crimes as
well as facilitating the prosecution of the criminals involved.
In the course of this Article, I will explain what mutual legal assist-
ance treaties do, explain the need for using them as opposed to the more
traditional forms of international assistance, discuss the history of these
treaties or their negotiation status, list the principal issues which arise in
the course of negotiating and implementing these treaties, and discuss
how these treaties have fared in American appellate courts.3
II. WHAT Is A MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY?
As stated above, a mutual legal assistance treaty imposes a binding
obligation on the treaty partners to provide specific categories of assist-
ance to each other in designated types of criminal investigations and
prosecutions, although the treaties may also cover assistance in certain
types of related civil or administrative proceedings as well.' As also
stated above, a treaty provides that this assistance will be provided di-
3 For other articles on mutual legal assistance treaties from a historical, treaty-by-treaty per-
spective, see Nadelmann, Negotiations on Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 AM. J. CoMP. L. 467
(1985); Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: A
Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 189 (1985).
4 A "mutual legal assistance treaty" is to be distinguished from other types of treaties or execu-
tive agreements to share evidence. It is different from a "tax information exchange agreement," like
the one authorized by the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, 26 U.S.C.
§ 274(h)(6)(C) (1982), which applies to the exchange of information in criminal and civil tax cases
only. We presently have such tax agreements signed or in force with Jamaica, Grenada, St. Lucia,
Barbados, and Dominica. The term "tax information exchange agreement" refers broadly to any
agreement which provides for the exchange of tax information which is otherwise confidential under
U.S. law. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(k)(4). There is also such a thing as a "tax treaty" which is designed
primarily to reduce or eliminate double taxation by the United States and its treaty partner through
exemptions, credits, special source rules, and the like, but which usually contains provisions on
evidence sharing to prevent evasion and avoidance. For a discussion of the use of this type of treaty
to secure evidence, see Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20
INT'L LAW. 1209 (1986); Seeman, Exchange of Information under International Tax Conventions, 17
INT'L LAW. 333 (1983).
A mutual legal assistance treaty could also serve the purpose of a tax information exchange
agreement, at least as to criminal offenses (e.g., the Dutch and Italian treaties were characterized as
"tax conventions" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 6103(k)(4) in their Senate reports), but usually
they are separate treaties negotiated by the Justice and Treasury Departments, respectively, in con-
junction with the State Department. Other types of arrangements to share evidence include execu-
tive agreements between governments on behalf of specific law enforcement agencies, such as the
customs assistance agreements the United States currently has with Austria, Canada, France, Italy,
Mexico, Spain and West Germany; or the so-called "Lockheed agreements" of the late 1970s which
were separate agreements to exchange evidence with certain foreign nations in a specific investiga-
tion.
There is a multilateral mutual legal assistance treaty: European Convention on Mutual Assist-
ance in Criminal Matters, opened for signature, Apr. 20, 1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185. The Convention
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rectly between the U.S. Justice Department and its foreign prosecutorial
counterpart outside the normal diplomatic channels and with minimal
judicial involvement, at least in the United States.
The most desired form of assistance is the obtaining of documentary
evidence, most notably bank or other corporate records. The treaty,
once implemented, typically authorizes the foreign prosecutor to either
directly, or through court order, obtain the desired records overcoming
local bank secrecy or other similar legal restrictions.'
"Legal assistance" covers more than the provision of documentary
evidence. It covers the provision of the necessary authenticating evi-
dence, like the live or deposed testimony of bank or other corporate of-
ficers or some specified form of certification. In addition, a mutual legal
assistance treaty will typically provide for the mandatory production of
non-privileged public documents and records, the discretionary produc-
tion of law enforcement records, the location of persons, the service of
subpoenas and other documents, the execution of requests for search and
seizure, the taking of testimony or depositions, the transportation of pris-
oners in custody for testimony abroad, the seizure and forfeiture of
criminals' assets, and occasionally the sharing of those assets between the
two governments.
The more recent treaties contain on the average about fifteen to
twenty articles. In addition to separate articles on each type of assistance
covered by the treaty, there will typically be an article defining the scope
of covered offenses and proceedings; an article providing safe conduct for
witnesses travelling to a requesting state to testify pursuant to the treaty;
does not really create any new procedures for obtaining evidence. It provides a procedure for exe-
cuting letters rogatory, but does not expand on this mechanism for securing evidence.
Procedures for the exchange of evidence between countries also exist in civil cases. See, e.g.,
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 discussed in reference to Societd Na-
tionallndustrielleAerospatielle v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), infra, note 96, and accompa-
nying text. The United States is a party to the Convention along with sixteen other countries.
Except as relevant to the referenced discussion, this Convention is beyond the scope of this Article.
Unlike the treaties which are the subject of this article, the Convention does not provide mandatory
procedures for obtaining evidence, nor does it have any effect on the scope of domestic law regarding
discovery.
For a discussion of problems in obtaining evidence in civil cases see, e.g., Struve, Discovery from
Foreign Parties in Civil Cases Before United States Courts, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & P. 1101 (1984);
Friedman & Wilson, Representing Foreign Clients in Civil Discovery and Grand Jury Proceedings, 26
Va. J. of Int'l L. 327 (1986).
5 Foreign bank secrecy laws typically provide criminal and/or civil penalties for disclosing to
third parties, including foreign governments, customer identity information, transactional informa-
tion, and other account information. See, eg., Federal Law on Banks and Savings Organizations,
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 47 (Swit.); PENAL CODE art. 273 (Switz.); Banks and Trust Companies
Regulation Act of 1965, Bah. Act. No. 64, Section 10; the Confidential Relationships (Preserva-
tion)(Amendment) Law (Cayman Islands 1979).
1988]
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an article setting forth limitations on compliance (e.g., if the request con-
cerns a "political offense"; if the request concerns an investigation of a
person immune to prosecution due to prior jeopardy); an article setting
forth the type of information to be included in a request for assistance; an
article specifying who the "central authority" is in each country; an arti-
cle concerning limitations on use of the information beyond the proceed-
ing for which it is sought; an article concerning the return of the evidence
after it is used; an article covering the relation of the treaty to the secur-
ing of evidence through other means (e.g., international conventions, let-
ters rogatory); an article concerning allocation of costs; and an article or
articles concerning the terms for having the treaty enter into force or
denounced.
III. WHY Is A MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY NEEDED?
The availability of assistance in obtaining evidence outside of the
judicial process is limited. Obviously there is such a thing as "police
cooperation"-the direct exchange of law enforcement information be-
tween police agencies in two countries. These channels can be direct
(e.g., through FBI or DEA attach6s stationed in U.S. embassies abroad)
or indirect (e.g., through Interpol). While much useful information, in-
cluding witness information, can be obtained through this process, the
ability to obtain evidence in this manner, particularly documentary evi-
dence, in a form that would be admissible in a U.S. judicial proceeding is
limited. The foreign police usually may obtain no more evidence than a
police agency in this country may obtain. Thus, they may only obtain
documents or other information that the holder is both willing and le-
gally able to surrender. Further, the ability to obtain evidence in this
manner is limited by the degree of cooperation that exists at a particular
moment in time between the concerned police agencies. There is no duty
to cooperate. Similar limitations apply, of course, to attempting to con-
tact witnesses or document holders directly. They have no obligation to
cooperate and problems of document authentication remain.
28 U.S.C. section 1783 permits a federal district court to issue a
subpoena for a U.S. citizen or resident alien who is in a foreign country
to appear to testify here.6 Such subpoenas are typically served by consu-
lar officials where permitted by foreign domestic law.7 Their utility is
limited not only by the nationality of the potential witness, but also by
the fact that there is no effective remedy to compel attendance unless the
person actually returns to the United States (although the possibility of
6 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982). Persons failing to comply with a subpoena are subject to being held
in contempt and could even have property forfeited, though this latter step is seldom taken. See 28
U.S.C. § 1784 (1982).
7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) for provisions governing service of process abroad.
Vol. 20.405
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES
passport revocation or future contempt actions will induce cooperation
in many situations).
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the tak-
ing of a deposition of a witness abroad.' Again, while useful, this provi-
sion is of limited value because there is no way to compel attendance and
because it raises the constitutional issue of witness confrontation. 9 For-
eign law may also restrict the manner in which such depositions are con-
ducted. An example of such a restriction is the Swiss requirement that
only officials of the foreign country conduct the deposition."0
The traditional way to compel the production of evidence located
abroad, whether in the form of live witnesses or documents, is the use of
letters rogatory.11 Letters rogatory are requests submitted, via diplo-
matic channels, from a judge in one country to a judge in another coun-
try to perform a specific act. The act might be ordering a witness to
testify, issuing a search warrant, or compelling the production of
documents.1 2
This procedure is terribly burdensome. First, it is time consuming.
The request must go through diplomatic channels and, once received,
requires formal judicial action. It may take months or even years to
complete the process, a time frame totally unsatisfactory in criminal liti-
gation. Second, the request must be in a form which satisfies foreign
legal requirements and which is understandable to foreign lawyers.
American legal terms may not be understood (particularly the peculiar
names for major federal offenses) so proper drafting is critical. The lan-
guage must be simple but the information provided must be sufficient to
convince the foreign judge that the evidence is needed. Third, judicial
assistance may not be available for a particular offense, particularly
8 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hay, 376
F. Supp. 264 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
Since the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1984) has
permitted the introduction of foreign records into evidence based on a certificate signed under pen-
alty of perjury. Cooperation is still needed to get this signature.
10 Switz. Penal Code art. 271 makes it a crime to take any action on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment on Swiss territory. This provision has been interpreted to include the taking of depositions.
For an account of how the Swiss interpret this provision and treated one "violator" (released after
arrest, but deposition transcripts confiscated) see Frei (Chief, Section of International Legal Assist-
ance, Federal Office, Police, Department of Justice and Police, Bern, Switzerland), Swiss Secrecy
Laws and Obtaining Evidence from Switzerland, in 1 FEDDERS, HARRIS, OLSEN & RISTAU, TRANS-
NATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCOMMODATIONS 14-15
(A.B.A. Nat'l Inst. 1984).
11 The authority of U.S. courts to respond to foreign letters rogatory is derived from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 (1982). 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (1982) gives the U.S. State Department the authority to transmit
a letter rogatory issued by a U.S. tribunal to a foreign government.
12 See, eg., United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946
(1972). No notice to the defendants is required to seek documentary evidence abroad.
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where it is a malum prohibitum offense like a tax, currency, or other
fiscal offense. Fourth, and most importantly, letters rogatory may not be
useful in securing evidence for grand jury proceedings, as opposed to a
trial, because many foreign countries, particularly those with a common
law tradition, require that the evidence requested be for a "judicial pro-
ceeding" and do not recognize the grand jury as such a judicial proceed-
ing. Fifth, letters rogatory generally will not be sufficient to overcome
local bank secrecy or other similar restrictions on producing
documents.1 3
These last two problems have become increasingly serious as inter-
national drug trafficking has grown in scope and sophistication. Drug
trafficking is a multi-billion dollar business.14 Proceeds from a U.S. drug
transaction, for example, may be transmitted either directly by hand or
by wire transfer from a bank in the United States to a branch in a foreign
bank secrecy jurisdiction. There the proceeds may be left, transmitted to
a third country, or "laundered" and returned to the United States in such
a manner as to make it appear that the money came from a legitimate
source. Tracing the route of the proceeds is critical to establishing who is
really behind the drug trafficking organization as well as for directly pro-
viding evidence of a violation of U.S. money laundering and currency
transaction reporting statutes. Such evidence is not simply the icing on a
cake of previously existing evidence so that it can be saved for trial. It is
evidence which is needed to develop the prima facie case necessary for a
grand jury indictment.
The only way to overcome the limitations placed on the traditional
methods for securing evidence in bank secrecy, and indeed in most other,
jurisdictions, is to have in effect a treaty which: 1) expressly permits the
use of foreign government process to obtain evidence for the entire inves-
tigative and prosecution process, including grand jury proceedings;
2) which expressly permits the use of foreign government process to ob-
tain evidence for nonfamiliar or nonuniversal forms of crime as well as
traditional forms of crime; 3) which expressly permits the waiver of for-
eign bank secrecy privileges under specified conditions; and 4) which pro-
vides an expedited means for securing this evidence in an admissible
form. Once in force after signature, ratification, or passage of required
implementing legislation,15 a mutual legal assistance treaty can overcome
13 See Worldwide Review of Status of United States Extradition Treaties and Mutual Legal
Assistance Treatie" Hearing Before the Task Force on International Narcotics Control of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 26-42 (Oct. 29, 1987) (testimony of Mark Richard).
14 See, eg., NATIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY BOARD, NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 2 (Jan. 1981).
15 Treaties in most foreign countries, unlike the United States, are not self-executing. In the
United States, a treaty takes precedence over a prior existing statute and is self-executing. U.S.
CONST. art. VI; Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 (1910); Amaya v. Stanolind Oil &
Vol. 20:405
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barriers to obtaining evidence abroad and can be a significant tool to U.S.
prosecutors in fighting drug trafficking, money laundering, and other
forms of crime.
Why would a foreign country want to enter into such a treaty, par-
ticularly when such a treaty might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as
jeopardizing the local banking industry and consequently the local econ-
omy? The reasons vary in importance from country to country, but they
include: 1) a general aversion to drug trafficking, heightened by increas-
ing local problems with drug addiction and related crime; 2) a desire to
obtain evidence from the United States for some specific purpose such as
a violation of domestic currency control laws; 3) a reaction to continued
diplomatic pressure and a desire to maintain friendly relations with the
United States; 4) the possibility of U.S. legislation detrimental to the for-
eign economy; 5) the influence of a parent country in the case of a depen-
dency; and 6) a desire to find an alternative to U.S. unilateral law
enforcement measures, like the service of subpoenas on U.S. branches of
foreign banks.' 6
Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1946), cerL denied, 331 U.S. 808 (1947). In most foreign countries,
implementing legislation is required. See, eg., Switzerland: Federal Law on the Treaty with the
United States of America on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Oct. 3, 1975.
16 See, eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d
1384 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1986); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740
F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). The courts, however, do require a
balancing test in determining whether to require the production of foreign records. See, ag., United
States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281, 1286-90 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981). "Courts must
balance competing interests in determining whether foreign illegality ought to preclude enforcement
of an IRS Summons." Id. at 1288. Among the factors to consider are: the relative public interests
at stake (e.g., the need to collect taxes v. the interest of a private party); the extent of the hardship
(e.g., could the company keep the records in the United States and avoid a possible Swiss prosecu-
tion); the location, nationality, and expectation of compliance; the importance of documents; and the
availability of alternate means of compliance provided they are likely to be fruitful. Id. at 1289-90.
The Vetco case, it should be noted, did not involve the production of foreign bank records (and
thereby implicate foreign bank secrecy laws), but rather the business records of a corporate subsidi-
ary.
But see, In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 497-99 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Roe v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987), which distinguishes the "Bank of Nova Scotia" cases but sug-
gests the D.C. Circuit might not follow them. Id. at 498.
See also, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the court required a
Cayman Islands bank official to testify, after being subpoenaed while traveling in the United States;
and United States v. Bowe, 694 F.2d 1256 (11th Cir. 1982), which upheld a similar subpoena on an
attorney.
Another recently utilized unilateral enforcement measure is known as the "Ghidoni waiver." In
United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984), the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the authority of a federal district court to order a grand jury target to sign a "con-
sent" form waiving a foreign bank secrecy privilege and directing the bank to turn over the records.
The Supreme Court has sustained the validity of these orders in Doe v. United States, 101 L. Ed. 2d
184 (1988).
On the Ghidoni issue, see also, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791 (1st Cir.
1988]
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This last factor is particularly noteworthy because recent court deci-
sions in the United States permitting the imposition of large fines for non
compliance with grand jury subpoenas for bank records located abroad,
are perceived as having provided a major impetus for the more recent
treaty negotiations with Great Britain, Canada, the Cayman Islands, and
the Bahamas.17 Also, the fact that the first U.S. treaty partner, Switzer-
land, did not suffer a loss in its banking business as a result of its mutual
legal assistance treaty with the United States has made other potential
treaty partners less wary of entering into similar arrangements, at least
where the offenses covered by the treaty do not include tax offenses
which are unrelated to other criminal activity.
Finally, a variety of purely political and economic factors may out-
weigh a foreign country's concerns about such a treaty. The banking
business is more critical in some countries than others. Some govern-
ments are sensitive to criticism in the United States about their efforts
against drug trafficking due to their proximity to the United States and
reliance on the tourist trade. Local political pressures are relevant. Fi-
nally, things as mundane as an upcoming visit by a head of state and the
desire to have something to sign may have an influence.
IV. TREATY STATUS
As of October 1, 1988, there are four mutual legal assistance treaties
in effect between the United States and foreign countries. The first, as
noted above, is with Switzerland, and entered into force in 1977. The
treaties with Turkey ("Turkish Treaty"),'" the Netherlands (including
the Netherlands Antilles) ("Netherlands Treaty"), 19 and Italy ("Italian
Treaty")20 entered into force in 1981, 1983, and 1985 respectively. An
interim executive agreement covering only drug offenses, not constituting
a formal treaty, has been in effect with the Cayman Islands since 1984,21
pending ratification of a full treaty which was negotiated and signed in
1987); Two Grand Jury Condemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1987) (petition for
cert. pending as of 6/1/88); In re N.Y.N.D. Grand Jury Subpoena #86-0351-S, 811 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1987).
17 See, e-g., Islands' Bank Secrecy Is Lifted for United States, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1984, at A3.
18 Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, United
States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981) [hereinafter Turk-
ish Treaty].
19 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, June 12, 1981,
United States-Nethertands, S. Doc. No. 17, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (entered into force Sept. 15, 1983),
[hereinafter Netherlands Treaty].
20 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, United States-Italy, S.
Doc. No. 25, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 24 I.L.M. 1536 (entered into force Nov. 13, 1985) [hereinafter
Italian Treaty].
21 Exchange of Letters Concerning the Cayman Islands and Matters Connected with, Arising
From, Related to, or Resulting from any Narcotics Activity Referred to in the Single Convention on
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MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES
1986.22 Similar interim executive agreements covering only drug offenses
have recently entered into force with the Turks and Caicos Islands
(1986),23 Anguilla (1987),24 Montserrat (1987),2" and the British Virgin
Islands (1987).26 In addition, interim executive agreements providing for
formal liaison procedures for exchanging evidence subject to negotiation
of a full mutual legal assistance treaty have been negotiated recently with
Haiti (1986),27 Great Britain (1988),28 and Nigeria (1987).29 Additional
treaties have been signed with Colombia (1980),10 Morocco (1983), 3'
Canada ("Canadian Treaty") (1985),32 Thailand (1986), 33 the Bahamas
Narcotic Drugs 1961, as amended July 26, 1984, United States-United Kingdom, 14 I.L.M. 1110
(entered into force Aug. 29, 1984) [hereinafter Cayman Islands Agreement].
22 Treaty Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, United
States-United Kingdom, S. Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 26 I.L.M. 537 (1987) (not yet entered
into force) [hereinafter Cayman Islands Treaty].
23 Exchange of Letters Concerning the Turks and Caicos Islands and Matters Connected With,
Arising From, Related To, or Resulting From Any Narcotics Activity Referred to in the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended Sept. 18, 1986 United States-United Kingdom,
D.S.B. 6.87 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
24 Exchange of Letters Concerning Anguilla and Matters Connected With, Arising From, Re-
lated To, or Resulting From Any Narcotics Activity Referred to in the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, 1961, as amended Mar. 11, 1987 United States-United Kingdom, D.S.B. 6.87 (entered
into force Mar. 27, 1987).
25 Exchange of Letters Concerning Montserrat and Matters Connected With, Arising From,
Related To, or Resulting From Any Narcotics Activity Referred to in the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended May 14, 1987 United States-United Kingdom, D.S.B. 8.87 (en-
tered into force June 1, 1987).
26 Exchange of Letters Concerning the British Virgin Islands and Matters Connected With,
Arising From, Related To, or Resulting From any Narcotics Activity Referred to in the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended Apr. 14, 1987 United States-United Kingdom,
1961, D.S.B. 9.87 (entered into force Aug. 12, 1987).
27 Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Law Enforcement Matters, Aug. 15,
1987, United States-Haiti. Unlike the above executive agreements, this one was negotiated directly
by the U.S. Justice Department and the Haitian Ministry of Justice. It simply provides for a liaison
procedure and calls for the negotiation of a mutual legal assistance treaty some time in the future.
28 Interim Agreement concerning the Investigation of Drug Trafficking Offenses and the
Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Drug Trafficking, Fed. 9, 1988, United
States-United Kingdom. This interim agreement creates no new mandatory procedures for ob-
taining evidence. It provides a detailed liaison procedure for exchanging evidence between the Jus-
tice Department and the Home Office and calls for the commencement of negotiations of a full treaty
in six months.
29 Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Law Enforcement Matters, Nov. 2,
1987, United States-Nigeria, D.S.B. 1.88. This agreement is similar in nature to the British one,
supra note 28, but is not limited to drug cases.
30 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, Aug. 20, 1980, United States-Colombia, T.I.A.S. No.
10734 (not yet entered into force). This treaty has been ratified by the United States but at this point
it does not appear Colombia will ratify it due to strong domestic opposition.
31 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Oct. 17, 1983, United States-Mo-
rocco, S. Doc. No. 24, D.S.B. 9.84 (not yet entered into force).
32 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Mar. 18, 1985, United States-Can-
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("Bahamas Treaty") (1987),1 4 Mexico (1987), 35 and Belgium (1988).36
Negotiations with West Germany, Great Britain, Panama, Australia,
Sweden, Jamaica, and Israel are at various stages. Within this last group,
it is this author's view that Panama is the number one U.S. priority for
concluding a treaty because it is a major money laundering center, but
the current political unrest there and the recent indictment of the Pana-
manian military leader, General Noriega, on drug trafficking charges has
sidetracked the resumption of negotiations which briefly started and then
broke down in 1985. 37
V. TREATY EXPERIENCE
The experience with treaties in force has generally been good. In the
first six years the Swiss Treaty was in force, the United States made 202
requests under the treaty and the Swiss made 65. This three to one ratio
has been maintained.38 But the Swiss are pleased. As stated by Swiss
Justice Minister Elisabeth Kopp in a recent interview:
Increasing economic interdependence has led to increased numbers of
requests and to requests regarding new forms of criminality. Interna-
tional mutual assistance is, contrary to the popular perception in Swit-
zerland, not a one-sided process. Although U.S. authorities have made
three times as many requests as the Swiss, our authorities have been
able to obtain search and seizure or freeze orders in the U.S., too.3
9
ada, S. Doc. No. 14, 100th Cong., 23nd Sess., 24 I.L.M. 1092, D.S.B. 5.88 (not yet entered into
force) [hereinafter Canadian Treaty].
33 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 19, 1986, United States-Thailand, S.
Doc. No. 18, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., D.S.B. 5.86 (not yet entered into force) [hereinafter Thai
Treaty].
34 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Aug. 18, 1987, United States-Bahamas, S.
Doc. No. 17, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., D.S.B. 11.87 (not yet entered into force) [hereinafter Bahamas
Treaty].
35 Treaty On Cooperation for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, United States-Mexico, S.
Doc. No. 13, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., D.S.B. 2.88 (not yet entered into force) [hereinafter Mexican
Treaty].
36 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 28, 1988, United States-Belgium,
(not yet entered into force) [hereinafter Belgian Treaty].
37 See generally U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAx HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN (1984), which
discusses the role of Panama as well as the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands as tax havens. In
reference to Panama, it was noted at the time that in Panamanian bank transactions with the Federal
Reserve Bank about 50% of the dollar value was in $20.00 or lower denomination bills, something
highly unusual in international transactions and which indicates to this author an illegal source
generating small denominations of cash. See id. at 31. The report noted also that of the IRS crimi-
nal tax investigations involving Caribbean Basin countries in the 1978-83 period, 55% involved ile-
gal income, and, of that 55%, 29% involved the Cayman Islands, 28% Panama, 22% the Bahamas,
and 11% the Netherlands Antilles. See id. at 34. No more recent information is publicly available.
38 These statistics have been provided to the author by the Office of International Affairs,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, which processes all treaty requests.
39 Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1987, at 33.
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In a study done by the Office of International Affairs in the Criminal
Division in January 1983, it was reported that in the first six years the
Swiss treaty was in force, the evidence obtained under the treaty had
contributed to about 145 federal and state convictions.' One particu-
larly noteworthy conviction was that of Michelle Sindona for fraud in
connection with the collapse of the Franklin National Bank.4' Three of
Sindona's fraudulent transactions had been disguised as time deposits in
Swiss banks. Records of these transactions were obtained to demonstrate
the fraud involved. Another noteworthy conviction was that of organ-
ized crime figure Anthony Giacalone who conspired with two Citibank
employees to embezzle $3 million.42 The money was laundered through
Swiss and other foreign bank accounts. Swiss bank records revealed the
money trail and Swiss hotel records proved the presence of the conspira-
tors in Switzerland at the time the money was distributed.
The greatest problem in implementing the Swiss Treaty has proven
to be the delay in obtaining evidence. The Swiss law permits requests to
be challenged and litigated through every appellate stage available with
objections by different parties considered seriatim rather than jointly.43
One request took two-and-a-half years to litigate and very nearly caused
an extension beyond the statute of limitations.'
Issues concerning application of the Swiss Treaty have reached the
Swiss Federal Tribunal, the highest judicial tribunal in Switzerland.
Most litigation there has been successful from the U.S. point of view.
The Tribunal has rejected challenges to the accuracy of statements in the
request for assistance4' and challenges to the good faith of the United
40 See supra note 38.
41 United States v. Sindona, No. S 75 Cr. 948 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. indictment filed Mar. 19,
1979), conviction affirmed, United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 912 (1981).
42 United States v. Giacalone, No. S 80 Cr. 123 (S.D.N.Y. indictment filed Feb. 6, 1980).
43 The requested state is to notify any person from whom testimonial or documentary evidence
is sought of the fact of a request, article 36(a) Swiss Treaty, supra note 2. Under article 37, § 2,
Swiss law and procedure governs in determining the validity of a treaty request to Switzerland. The
Swiss practice of adjudicating each challenge by an interested party seriatim through the various
layers of the Swiss government up to the Federal Judicial Tribunal has created a major delay prob-
lem in some cases according to attorneys who are familiar with the operation of the treaty.
44 See testimony of Mark Richard, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judi-
ciary, House of Representatives (Apr. 25, 1984). See, eg., United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919
(3d Cir. 1981). In that case, the defendants got a bank officer to appeal a treaty request that he be
deposed to authenticate some bank records. The procedure forced the request beyond the trial date
so the evidence could not be used. The new Memorandum of Understanding, infra note 104, at-
tempts to deal with this problem by creating streamlined procedures for processing requests.
45 Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, Sept. 28, 1979, on appeal of Generations Holdings
Ltd and Pierre de Charmant, A 168/78; Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, Feb. 27, 1980, in
the case of Frederick Zuendel, A 10/80/ha; Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, May 12, 1982,
in the Matter of John M. Seabrook.
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States in requesting evidence for a crime covered by the treaty.' 6 A suc-
cessful challenge was made on the basis that the offense described in the
treaty request was not covered by the treaty under the "dual criminality
standard" which is discussed below.4 7
The treaty with the Netherlands is also working well. According to
the government attorney responsible for processing requests to and from
the Netherlands, roughly twenty-five requests are made under the treaty
by the United States on an annual basis now, about half of which are for
information contained in the Netherlands Antilles. The Dutch, in turn,
are making approximately one-half as many requests to us as we are to
them. There have been no particularly noteworthy cases or pertinent
appellate court decisions in Dutch courts.
By contrast, as of early 1988, the Turks have made ninety-eight re-
quests while the United States has made only one under the Turkish
Treaty. There are no public records concerning the nature of the re-
quests made by Turkey to date, but the author has spoken with the gov-
ernment attorney who is responsible for reviewing those requests, and he
has indicated that they cover a wide variety of offenses ranging from very
serious felonies to what would be viewed in the United States as rela-
tively insignificant misdemeanors. The Italians have made over twice as
many requests to the United States as the United States has to Italy in
the first two years that the Italian Treaty has been in force.48 The fact
that Italy and Turkey, unlike Switzerland and the Netherlands, are mak-
ing the majority of requests for assistance is not surprising. The United
States could be expected to make the majority of the requests under trea-
ties with bank secrecy jurisdictions. Foreign governments can be ex-
pected to make the majority of requests when a substantial number of
their nationals or their descendants reside in, or travel to, the United
States.
None of the requests under the Italian Treaty have resulted in pub-
lished court opinions to date and no legal issues of interpretation have
arisen. However, the treaty, in its short life span, has played a very im-
portant role in two recent internationally well-publicized organized
crime cases. The United States made numerous requests for assistance
from Italy in the so-called "Pizza Connection" prosecution in New York
City.4 9 This case involved the operation of a heroin distribution network
by major organized crime figures. (The heroin, after being shipped into
this country, was distributed through local pizza parlors.) Over twenty
46 See, e.g., Generations Holdings, Ltd. and Pierre de Chartnant, supra note 45.
47 See, e.g., Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, Nov. 16, 1979, in the case of Amir
Zangenes, A 352/78/65.
48 See supra note 38.
49 United States v. Badalamenti, No. 84-236 (S.D.N.Y. indictment filed Apr. 19, 1984). See
United States v. Badalamenti, 626 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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Italian police officers went to New York to testify as a result of some of
these requests. Conversely, the Italians made many requests to the
United States for assistance in the famous 400 plus defendant "maxi-
trial" of Mafia leaders in Sicily."0 The assistance consisted largely of ful-
filling requests to serve documents on witnesses and to take depositions.
Many depositions were taken including the depositions of two of the key
cooperating defendants, Tomasso Buscetta and Salvatore Cantorno.
While these two individuals ended up testifying at the actual trial, the
Italians, in lieu of live testimony, used depositions taken of both under-
cover and regular agents of U.S. law enforcement agencies. They also
utilized depositions of several cooperating individuals, including two
money launderers.
The experience with the Cayman Islands Agreement has been par-
ticularly good. As of October 1, 1987, fifty-one initial requests and forty
follow-up requests have been made to the Cayman Islands.51 Ninety-five
drug traffickers have been convicted with evidence obtained pursuant to
these requests, a third of whom were convicted of violating the federal
continuing criminal enterprise or "drug kingpin" statute.52 (By contrast,
only six percent of the total number of defendants charged in the overall
federal drug enforcement task force program in the first three months of
1988 were charged with this offense.) 53 The evidence has proved ex-
tremely valuable in asset forfeiture proceedings as well. In one case, the
United States obtained a $7.3 million forfeiture of cash deposited in a
Houston bank account, introducing as evidence the records of the Cay-
man Islands "shell companies" used by the traffickers to move money in
and out of the accounts in the Houston bank.54
The success under the interim Cayman Islands Agreement bodes
well for further success once final treaties with the Cayman Islands and
the Bahamas, two major bank secrecy jurisdictions, enter into force. As
of October 1, 1988, ratification of these two treaties, plus the ones with
Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Thailand, was pending on the Senate floor,
after approval by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. All but the
Thai Treaty are ready to enter into force upon Senate ratification and
exchange of notes.
50 Giovanni Abate and 467 People, No. 2289-92 (Palermo).
51 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CRIM. DIVISION, LAW ENFORCEMENT ALERT, ACcEss TO EVIDENCE
IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES 4 (Feb. 1988).
52 Id.
53 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES STATISTICS
AS OF MARCH 31 (1988). As of March 1988, of the 1,160 persons indicted in Task Force cases; 69 of
these defendants were charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 848, the so-called Continuing Crimi-
nal Enterprise or "drug kingpin" statute. A similar percentage was found in examining the 1987
reports.
54 United States v. Funds Being Held in the Name of European Commodities Ltd., Civ. Action
No. H-84-2810 (S.D. Tex., filed July 3, 1984).
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VI. ISSUES IN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
What are the critical issues confronting negotiators of mutual legal
assistance treaties? How are these issues addressed in the various treaty
texts negotiated to date and how are these texts interpreted after they
enter into force?
A. Scope of Covered Offenses
Clearly, the most critical issue is the scope of offenses for which
assistance will be made available to a requesting country pursuant to a
particular treaty. There is no question that traditional crimes like mur-
der, theft, and drug selling should be covered. But many U.S. federal
crimes such as conspiracy," RICO,5  mail fraud,57 continuing criminal
enterprise,58 ITAR, 59 and money laundering,' are defined in non tradi-
tional terms. These are the crimes which are most likely to be the of-
fenses for which assistance is sought in a particular U.S. case. The term
"conspiracy" poses a special problem because it is either unknown in
foreign legal systems or is known under different and usually more re-
strictive terminology.
The typical historic approach under extradition treaties has been to
require that there be "dual criminality" for an offense to be covered by a
particular treaty. In other words, the offense in question must be one
that is punishable under the laws of both treaty partners. This standard
has been subject to both narrow and broad interpretation. Under the
narrow approach, the actual elements of the crime must be identical,
hence a mail fraud charge would not be the basis for an extradition be-
cause the notion of "interstate activity" is unknown in foreign law.6"
Under a broad approach, a statute like mail fraud might pass muster
because the foreign court reviewing an extradition request would look to
the actual conduct involved-fraud-and find that the conduct alleged is
one that is illegal in both countries though under different names.6 2
55 18 U.S.C. § 371.
56 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
57 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
58 18 U.S.C. § 848.
59 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
60 18 U.S.C. § 1956, 1957.
61 In one notorious case, a French court denied an extradition request on an arson charge,
because the defendant, who had fire bombed a commercial establishment, would not have been
chargeable under French law with "arson" but with a different fire bombing offense. Tchakhutian,
Vicken, No. 1088-82 (Cour d'Appel de Paris), Aug. 18, 1982.
62 See, e.g., Request for Judicial Assistance (re Santa Fe Int'l Corp.), A 1/84 (Swiss Federal
Court, First Court of Public Law), May 16, 1984. The Swiss court granted assistance in an insider
trading case. It ruled that there was no equivalent statute in Swiss law and that the conduct in
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However, some RICO or money laundering offenses, might not pass
muster even under a broad "dual criminality" standard, because the con-
duct involved in the offense would not be criminal if committed in the
foreign country.63
A modem extradition or mutual legal assistance treaty will implic-
itly or explicitly cover "conspiracy."4 A modem extradition or mutual
legal assistance treaty will explicitly adopt a broad dual criminality inter-
pretation, so that, for example, courts will not question the use of a treaty
in mail fraud cases.65 These safeguard provisions are sought in modem
extradition, as well as mutual legal assistance, treaty negotiations.
Dual criminality remains the governing principle in extradition as
opposed to mutual legal assistance treaties. The reason for the distinc-
tion is that it is more controversial to arrest and surrender a "person" to
another country for conduct which would not be illegal locally, than to
simply secure physical "evidence" and turn that over. U.S. extradition
treaty negotiators try to insure coverage of so-called "peripheral" crimes
(e.g., conspiracy, federal mail or wire fraud)-crimes that involve con-
duct covered by both countries' laws but in a different manner. U.S.
mutual legal assistance treaty negotiators, by contrast, try to achieve a
treaty which will cover offenses which would usually not even be covered
by a broad dual criminality standard.
The principal issue in mutual legal assistance treaty negotiations
usually relates to the inclusion or exclusion of so-called tax or other fiscal
offenses. It is in the interest of the United States to seek assistance in tax
matters in order to avoid the use of foreign bank accounts by U.S. citi-
zens to avoid payment of income taxes. As the U.S. Supreme Court itself
has said, "Taxes are the lifeblood of government."'66 Even if this greater
goal cannot be achieved, some treaty partners agree to provide assistance
in the prosecution of criminals like drug traffickers for tax offenses even
question would not constitute fraud in Switzerland. However, it would be a violation of Swiss law to
reveal confidential business information, so on that basis dual criminality was established and assist-
ance was granted.
63 Both the RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962) and the money laundering statutes (18 U.S.C. § 1956) are
defined by reference to the commission of specified underlying crimes commonly referred to as
"predicate offenses." If the underlying crime is not a crime in the foreign country, dual criminality
would not exist. Further, in the case of the money laundering statute, even if the underlying crime
or crimes are covered by foreign law, the act of "laundering" the proceeds itself may not be covered
absent the existence of a foreign statute applicable to a particular fact situation. Such a statute might
be one which penalizes the receipt of stolen property or which penalizes conduct constituting being
an accessory after the fact.
64 Thai Treaty, supra note 33, art. 15.
65 See, eg., Swiss Treaty, supra note 2, art. 4, § 2. Mutual legal assistance treaties are generally
not limited by the dual criminality standard as discussed below.
66 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
4191988]
CASE W. RES. J INML LV
when the underlying drug or other criminal activity cannot be prose-
cuted due to a lack of evidence.
On the other hand, most foreign governments are not concerned
with evasion of U.S. tax laws. The economies of many foreign countries
are dependent in part, and in a few cases almost entirely, on a local bank-
ing industry which thrives for the very reason that banking transactions
will be treated as confidential. A proper balance must be struck between
the needs and priorities of the two treaty partners.
The first mutual legal assistance treaty with Switzerland states that
it is applicable to all offenses except antitrust, tax and other fiscal offenses
like customs duties and exchange controls.' It goes on, however, to
state that assistance will be provided for the excepted offenses where they
were committed "in furtherance of the purposes of an organized criminal
group.' 68
By contrast, the mutual legal assistance treaty with the Netherlands
is very broad. It places only two specific limitations on treaty scope:
(1) requests for search and seizure have to be predicated on offenses for
which there is dual criminality using a broad standard of interpreta-
tion;69 and (2) the Netherlands reserves the right to declare the treaty
inapplicable to fiscal offenses where the information was in the Nether-
lands Antilles, although this restriction may always be changed by diplo-
matic note.70
The Italian Treaty is also very broad. It covers all criminal investi-
gations and proceedings without regard to dual criminality,71 subject
only to the traditional limitations for "political" or "military" offenses
that apply in all treaties and a catchall limitation if execution of the re-
quest would prejudice "the security or other essential public interests of
the requested state."72 The Turkish Treaty and the recently negotiated
treaties with Canada and Belgium are similarly broad in scope.73
The two significant recently negotiated treaties with the Bahamas
and the Cayman Islands, both major banking industry centers, illustrate,
in different ways, the balance that is struck between the desire of the
United States to prosecute drug traffickers, money launderers and major
67 Swiss Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1, § l(a), and art. 2, § 1. However, "compulsory measures"
were generally limited to offenses for which dual criminality exists or which were listed on an at-
tached schedule. See id. art. 4.
68 Id. art. 2, § 2.
69 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 19, art. 6, § 2.
70 Id. art. 20, § 2. The reservation was exercised before the treaty entered into force.
71 Italian Treaty, supra note 20, art. 1, § 3.
72 Id. art. 5, § 1.
73 Turkish Treaty, supra note 18, art. 21, § 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 32, art. I, art. II,
§§ 1, 3; Belgian Treaty, supra note 36, art. I, § 3.
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criminals in every way possible and the desire of countries or dependen-
cies to preserve bank secrecy.
The Cayman Islands Treaty embraces the following classes of crimi-
nal offenses: (a) felony conduct satisfying the dual criminality standard;
(b) "racketeering" conduct which it carefully defines; (c) "narcotics traf-
ficking" which is defined to cover all offenses "arising from, related to or
resulting from" narcotics activity-a phrase designed to embrace con-
spiracy and CCE charges; (d) the use of fraud to obtain currency in con-
nection with a scheme to promote a tax shelter (though that precise
terminology is not used); (e) false statements to tax authorities in refer-
ence to a tax matter arising from the unlawful proceeds of a criminal
offense; (f) failure to make a currency transaction report; (g) insider trad-
ing offenses; (h) fraudulent securities practices; (i) foreign "corrupt prac-
tices"; (j) any U.S. criminal offense predicated on the use of mails or
other interstate facilities; (k) any offense later agreed to in a diplomatic
note; and (1) any attempt or conspiracy for any of the above or being an
accessory after the fact to any of the above.74 While this definition ex-
cludes tax offenses not covered by (d) or (e) above, it is sufficiently broad
to cover almost any other offense in which U.S. authorities have a cur-
rent interest.
The Bahamas Treaty provision defining what the treaty terms "of-
fenses" is shorter and somewhat less specific, but can reasonably be inter-
preted to cover conduct in any of the Cayman Islands categories. An
"offense" is any conduct which satisfies the dual criminality standard or
which is felony conduct "which arises from, relates to, results from, or
otherwise includes": 1) drug trafficking; 2) theft (including the obtaining
of money by false representations, pretenses, or by embezzlement); 3) vi-
olence; 4) fraud-including fraud on the government; and 5) a violation
of a law relating to currency or financial transactions which is integrally
related to the commission of another type of criminal activity covered by
the treaty.75 Tax offenses are excluded from coverage to the extent that
their commission is unrelated to the commission of offenses in any of the
categories listed above.
Even though the United States typically prefers the broadest possi-
ble mutual legal assistance treaty, it has accepted treaties which cover
only: 1) drug trafficking offenses; 2) traditional forms of crime like fraud
and theft; and 3) tax and other fiscal offenses, but only insofar as they
relate to either 1) or 2).76 While undoubtedly there is the potential for
diplomatic or judicial disputes concerning the application of this last cat-
74 Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 22, art. 19, § 3.
75 Bahamas Treaty, supra note 34, art. 2, § 1.
76 Initial discussions with Panama broke down when the Panamanians attempted to limit a
possible mutual legal assistance treaty to drug offenses. The United States made an exception in the
case of the interim agreements with the Cayman Islands and the other British dependencies dis-
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egory in a particular fact situation, the experience to date suggests that
this problem should be limited as long as the United States acts in good
faith in making requests and the concerned foreign governments main-
tain a general attitude of cooperation.
B. Scope of Covered Proceedings
Assistance, of course, is needed principally for criminal trials. As
noted above, assistance is also needed at the investigative and grand jury
stage. All mutual legal assistance treaties cover grand jury proceedings
either expressly" or by implication through the provision for assistance
in "investigations" as well as "court proceedings."78
However, there are other types of proceedings which are quasi-crim-
inal in nature-that is to say, they are ancillary to enforcement of the
criminal laws but may be civil or administrative in nature. Forfeiture
proceedings are one example. The Swiss Treaty covers both criminal
"investigations or court proceedings" and forfeiture proceedings involv-
ing the forfeiture of items obtained through criminal offenses.79 The
Netherlands Treaty does not cover forfeiture proceedings.80 The Nether-
lands, unlike Switzerland, did not have a broad forfeiture law, and forfei-
ture, at the time of the negotiations in the late 1970s, was not the major
tool against drug traffickers that it has become today.
The more recent treaties are broader in terms of the proceedings to
which they are potentially applicable. The Cayman Islands Treaty cov-
ers civil and administrative proceedings relating to drug trafficking, as
well as criminal proceedings.8" The Bahamas Treaty covers judicial or
administrative forfeiture of drug trafficking proceeds or instrumentalities
and, in the discretion of the requested state, proceedings to impose or
enforce restitution orders or fines, and proceedings to impose civil or ad-
ministrative sanctions on an offender.8 2
C. Forfeiture of Confiscated Assets
Assistance in forfeiture proceedings can extend beyond the mere
provision of evidence. It can extend to an obligation to immobilize or
forfeit the asset, and it can extend to an obligation to return the forfeited
asset, or the proceeds of its sale, to the requesting state.
cussed above, limiting them to drug cases, but only on the condition that they be a prelude to
negotiation of a full mutual legal assistance treaty.
77 See, e.g., Bahamas Treaty, supra note 34, art. 2, § 3(b).
78 See, e.g., Swiss Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1, § l(a).
79 Swiss Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1, § 1.
80 Netherlands Treaty, supra note 19, art. 1, § 1.
81 Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 22, art. 1, § 1.
82 Bahamas Treaty, supra note 34, art. 2, § 2.
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The Swiss Treaty, as noted above, is expressly applicable to forfei-
ture proceedings.83 Switzerland has a law which permits the forfeiture to
the government of the proceeds of foreign drug violations and, after the
mutual legal assistance treaty entered into force, took great advantage of
this capability.8 4
The Italian Treaty is unique in that it explicitly provides that not
only does a requested state have authority "in emergency situations" to
immobilize the assets of criminals who have committed a foreign viola-
tion which are subject to forfeiture, but that the requested state "shall
have authority" to order the forfeiture of those assets to the requesting
state.85 In other words, it was contemplated by the negotiators that
seized property would be transferred, or sold and the proceeds trans-
ferred, to the other country. While this transfer of forfeited assets sounds
good in theory, it raises serious concerns about the possibility of foreign
governments owning property in the United States, about forfeiting prop-
erty for violations of statutes which if violated here would not warrant
forfeiture, and about a lack of mutuality of interest where a government
is forced to undertake what could be a protracted judicial proceeding,
and assume administrative responsibility for managing property, in
which it has no present or potential future interest.
Until November 1986, the United States had no authority to forfeit
the proceeds of foreign crimes in general or to implement the Italian
treaty provision in particular. Thus, the United States could not do what
the Swiss could do-forfeit foreign drug proceeds. With the passage of a
new provision in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, there is now statu-
tory authority: (1) to forfeit the proceeds of a foreign drug trafficking
offense;86 and, (2) when a treaty so authorizes, to sell the property and
transfer the proceeds to a foreign country (at least when there has been
joint participation in the investigation leading to the forfeiture.) 7 Italy,
as of October 1988, has yet to pass its implementing legislation.
It is the author's view that it is better for the country where forfeited
assets are located to keep those assets. This way, the problems noted
above can be avoided. However, if there has been joint cooperation in an
investigation the United States ought to be able to share conveyances like
83 See supra note 79.
84 Switzerland: Federal Law on Narcotics, art. 24. The propriety of such an action in drug
cases was affirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, Decision in the case of David Miller, No. A
410/81. See also statement of Elisabeth Kopp, supra note 39, which specifically notes the impor-
tance to Switzerland of this provision. However, ifassets seized belong to an individual victim, as in
a fraud case, they are returned to the victim. See generally Wirth, Attachment of Swiss Bank Ac-
counts A Remedy for International Debt Collection, 36 Bus. LAW. 1029 (1981).
85 Italian Treaty, supra note 20, art. 18.
86 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B)(Supp. IV 1986).
87 18 U.S.C. § 981(i)(1)(Supp. IV 1986).
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boats and planes, or the proceeds of other forfeited assets, with partici-
pating foreign law enforcement agencies. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 permits this limited sharing but requires the existence of a formal
treaty provision authorizing the sharing of assets between the treaty
partners.
Obviously such a treaty provision could appear in a mutual legal
assistance treaty, as it does in the Italian one, but three treaties negoti-
ated since November 1986, the ones with Mexico, Belgium, and the Ba-
hamas, do not include a provision covering the sharing of forfeited assets.
The more recently negotiated treaties simply provide: (1) for the provi-
sion of evidence for forfeiture proceedings; (2) some form of language
calling on a state where forfeitable property is located to notify the other
of that fact; and (3) to make a determination as to whether the institution
of domestic forfeiture proceedings is appropriate in such instances."8
This approach is the best approach in my opinion. A foreign state is
obligated to affirmatively consider the possibility of seeking forfeiture but
is not obligated to actually seek it. By analogy, in extradition cases there
is an obligation to extradite, but never an obligation to prosecute the
offender himself. A greater obligation to actually prosecute a person
would be, arguably, an infringement on domestic sovereignty and on the
exercise of domestic prosecutorial discretion. An obligation to forfeit
property on behalf of, and for the benefit of, a foreign government re-
gardless of how the local prosecutor views the available evidence, is like-
wise an infringement on domestic sovereignty and prosecutorial
discretion in my opinion.
D. Exclusivity
A major issue is whether treaty partners should exclusively use the
treaty provisions to obtain evidence abroad. It is a very sensitive issue,
particularly with West European countries. This issue is one aspect of a
much larger debate over the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. 9
The Swiss treaty contains no provision obligating the parties to ex-
clusively use its provisions to obtain evidence. In 1983 there was a major
diplomatic debate when, as part of the Marc Rich tax investigation, a
88 See, e.g., Bahamas Treaty, supra note 34, art. 14; Canadian Treaty, supra note 32, art. XVII;
Thai Treaty, supra note 33, art. 15. The interim agreement signed this past February with Great
Britain, supra note 28, at art. 10, § 3, provides that either party "may transfer forfeited assets, or the
proceeds of their sale to the other Party, to the extent permitted by their respective laws .. " Since
this agreement is not a formal treaty, it is doubtful that the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 981
(i)(1)(Supp. IV 1986) for a transfer have been satisfied.
89 See, e.g., Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887
(1985); Robinson, Compelling Discovery and Evidence in International Litigation, 18 INT'L LAW.
533 (1984); Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579
(1983).
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grand jury subpoena was issued to the New York branch of Marc Rich,
Inc., a Swiss corporation, to produce certain corporate records which
were located in Switzerland, and fines of $50,000 a day were imposed for
noncompliance.9" The Swiss Government ordered Rich not to comply
with the subpoena and on three separate occasions even seized various
documents sought to be produced. The Swiss claimed that the United
States could obtain the documents pursuant to a new law enacted in 1981
in Switzerland called the Swiss Federal Act on Mutual Assistance. 91 The
U.S. position was that neither the mutual legal assistance treaty nor the
subsequently enacted Swiss domestic legislation authorized assistance for
the type of tax fraud with which Marc Rich was charged.92 The two
Bank of Nova Scotia cases have made it clear that so-called extraterrito-
rial subpoenas are appropriate and that sanctions may be imposed for
noncompliance even when compliance might cause a violation of a for-
eign bank secrecy statute.93
Does the mere existence of a mutual legal assistance treaty solve the
problem of access to foreign bank records so that use of these subpoenas
should be abandoned? Not necessarily. A treaty may not cover the of-
90 United States v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., No. 83 Cr. 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Use of subpoenas
and imposition of fines affirmed, United States v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
91 Swiss Federal Act of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC), entered into force on
Mar. 20, 1981.
For one statement of the Swiss position see, In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 736 F.2d 864, 866
(2d Cir. 1984). The Swiss appeared as amicus curiae in an appeal by Rich from a denial of a motion
in district court to terminate the fines. The court declined to rule on the merits of the Swiss position
in this opinion primarily because the relevance of the Swiss law and actions had not been timely
raised by Rich. Id. at 867.
92 For a complete statement as to why the various alternatives suggested formally and infor-
mally by the Swiss Government were perceived as unsatisfactory by the United States, see Olsen, An
Overview of the Use of Compulsory Process by Federal Agencies to Gather Evidence in Administrative,
Civil, and Criminal Cases.- Bank of Nova Scotia, Marc Rich, Toyota Motor Corp., and Banca della
Svizzera Italiana Examined, in TRANSNATIONAL LmGATION: PRACCAL APPROACHES TO CON-
FLICTS AND ACCOMMODATIONS 792-93 (1984) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LTGATiON]. Mr. Ol-
sen, at that time a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Tax Division of the Justice
Department, argued: (1) the mutual legal assistance treaty was inapplicable to tax matters; (2) the
new Swiss legislation was not in effect when the subpoena was served; and (3) the regular tax treaty
with Switzerland, while providing for the exchange of evidence, did not provide for it to be furnished
in admissible form.
The author has been informed that in June, 1984, the documents were requested pursuant to
this new legislation, but that only some were produced six months later and not in a form to be of
any value in trial. Rich, though indicted, has never been tried. He resides in Switzerland which will
not extradite for tax offenses.
For a good narrative of the Marc Rich investigation see Tully, The Lifestyle of Rich, The Infa-
mous, Fortune (Dec. 22, 1986) at 39-42.
93 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384,
1388 (1 lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1986); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740
F.2d 817, 828 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
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fense being investigated. Subpoenas create an immediate obligation to
produce. A treaty request might take weeks during which a bank or indi-
vidual might remove or alter records. A treaty request may not ulti-
mately be honored. Sanctions, like fines for contempt, are available
against a bank officer for noncompliance with a subpoena but obviously
not against a foreign official for noncompliance with a treaty request.
The issue of exclusivity has arisen in several court decisions, but not
in the context of a mutual legal assistance treaty. The court in the sec-
ond Bank of Nova Scotia case,94 rejected an argument by a Canadian
bank that a so-called nonbinding, informal "gentlemen's agreement" en-
tered into in 1982 between U.S. and Cayman Islands officials establishing
a procedure for obtaining bank records protected by Cayman Islands
bank secrecy laws, constituted the exclusive or even the first means for
securing those records. The court noted that, to the extent the agreement
was binding or applicable at all, it did not purport to limit existing law
enforcement investigative methods like the grand jury subpoena.9"
The Supreme Court recently rejected an argument in a civil case
that the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters constituted an exclusive method for obtaining evi-
dence.9 6 The Court held that the plaintiffs could rely on traditional dis-
covery devices provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even
when the evidence seized was located abroad.97 The Court left open, on
a case-by-case basis, the possibility that a trial court should insist on
resorting to the Convention, under its supervisory powers in the discov-
ery process, to minimize undue burdensomeness on the opposing party.9 8
Four Justices issued a strong partial dissent. They stated that the
Convention ought to be resorted to first in most cases even though they
acknowledged that the Convention did not purport to provide a method
94 United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 829-30. while no court has expressly
ruled on an exclusivity issue in the context of a mutual legal assistance treaty, a federal district court
which was ruling on the admissibility of certain out-of-court declarations in the Badalamenti case
rejected a defense argument that the declarants should have been produced in court under the
United States-Italian mutual legal assistance treaty, which provides procedures for compelling for-
eign prisoners to travel abroad to testify. See United States v. Badalamenti, 626 F. Supp. 658, 664
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court noted that the particular individuals were facing trial in Italy, and that,
under the treaty, Italy has the right to refuse to produce them, which it had.
95 Id. at 830. This "gentlemen's agreement" really amounted to an exchange of letters in one
of which the Cayman Islands stated that requests for records would be reviewed by the Governor
and the Council. The agreement was unenforceable. As a result of this decision, however, steps
were taken diplomatically which led to the negotiation of the interim agreement, discussed above,
supra note 21 and accompanying text. Accord United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d at 1286, which
held that the United States-Swiss Tax Treaty did not foreclose the use of an IRS summons for the
records of the Swiss subsidiaries of an American corporation.
96 Societ6 National Industrielle Aerospatielle v. United States, 107 S. Ct. at 2542.
97 Id. at 2553-55.
98 Id. at 2556.
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of first or exclusive resort.99 The fact that four Justices joined in this
dissent could create a motive for defendants or witnesses to pursue the
exclusivity issue in the context of a mutual legal assistance treaty. How-
ever, as noted below in the discussion of Cardenas v. Smith," ° the trea-
ties generally expressly foreclose standing for private parties to allege
treaty violations, at least when no constitutional issues are raised.
The issue of exclusivity is addressed in some of the more recent trea-
ties. The Canadian Treaty creates an obligation to "request assistance"
pursuant to the treaty. If denial or delay could jeopardize successful
completion of an investigation, consultation is to occur. If not otherwise
agreed, the obligation to consult is considered terminated after thirty
days and no further obligation exists.10' At no point is there an express
restriction on the use of subpoenas. It is undoubtedly contemplated that
their enforcement, as opposed to imposition, would not occur until "con-
sultations" were concluded unsuccessfully.
The Cayman Islands Treaty also creates an obligation to seek assist-
ance under the treaty for an offense covered by its terms. Enforcement of
compulsory measures like grand jury subpoenas (as opposed to issuance)
is expressly stayed. If denial or unreasonable delay occurs, the request-
ing party will give the other party forty-five days notice that its "obliga-
tions... under this [a]rtile... have been fulfilled." In no event may
enforcement occur before the lapse of ninety days from the date assist-
ance was first requested. 2
The Bahamas Treaty provides no formal procedure for dealing with
issues of exclusivity.'03 However, in article 18, section 2, there is an ex-
press obligation to request assistance pursuant to the treaty without a
prohibition on the use of other forms of evidence procurement.
Finally, spurred on by the Marc Rich case, the United States and
Switzerland entered into a long period of negotiations on the issue of
exclusivity. A "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed in Novem-
ber of 1987 between U.S. Attorney General Meese and Swiss Justice
Minister Elisabeth Kopp on use of the treaty."° The agreement provides
that the requesting party will first seek assistance pursuant to the treaty
or the informal views of the requested party regarding the availability of
the treaty to secure the evidence.' 05 Where denial or unreasonable delay
99 Id. at 2558.
100 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
10! Canadaian Treaty, supra note 32, art. 4, § 1.
102 Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 22, art. 17.
103 Bahamas Treaty, supra note 34.
104 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Ancillary Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, signed Nov. 10, 1987.
105 Id. at § III, 2.
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would prejudice an investigation, the parties will consult over a thirty
day period to try to resolve the matter.10 6 After that period, a requesting
party is to use "moderation and restraint" in undertaking enforcement of
unilateral compulsory measures to secure the evidence in question. 7
Conversely, in resisting the use of "unilateral compulsory measures," the
requested party commits to exercising "moderation and restraint."' 08
E. Incompatible Legal Systems
A significant "technical" problem in negotiating mutual legal assist-
ance treaties is the reconciliation of conflicting legal systems. The United
States has a system under which executive branch officials investigate
and then prosecute in an adversary setting. In countries with a civil law
tradition like Switzerland and Italy, independent magistrates conduct an
investigation, once it has been referred to them by the police, in an in-
quisitorial manner-they are both judges and prosecutors at the same
time.'0 9 The original Swiss treaty, forty-one articles long, was very de-
tailed in terms of how various requests would be implemented under the
treaty. Subsequent treaties tend to be less specific, leaving details of im-
plementation open.
Another example of incompatibility has plagued the negotiations
with Mexico, which resumed in 1985 after an earlier breakdown in 1980
due in large part to a problem concerning depositions. The ability to
compel attendance at a deposition to secure oral testimony is critical to
the value of a mutual legal assistance treaty. Mexico took the position
that, under its Constitution, compulsory attendance is unconstitutional
unless there is evidence of a violation of Mexican law as well as foreign
law.1 0 This problem may be easy to avoid when international drug traf-
ficking or money laundering occurs, but with other crimes it will not be
so easy to demonstrate a violation of Mexican law. The treaty, as finally
negotiated, simply provides that testimony in the requested state shall be
compelled "to the same extent as in criminal investigations or proceed-
ings" in that state."'
Many countries, like Switzerland, require that any questioning be
106 Id. at § III, 3.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 For a good description of the investigative role played by Swiss magistrates, see Chamblee,
International LegalAssistance in Criminal Cases, in TRANSNATIONAL LIGATION supra note 10, at
195-202.
110 See MEX. CONST., art. 16, reprinted in G. FITZGERALD, CONSTITUTIONS OF LATIN
AMERICA 147-48 (1968). That article states in part that there can be no detention or compulsion
except upon order of judicial authority which must be preceded by a complaint, accusation, or de-
nouncement based on an act which the law will punish.
I1 Mexican Treaty, supra note 35, art. 7, § 1.
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conducted by their own officials. 1 2  This requirement can create
problems because questions have to be asked to satisfy U.S. evidentiary
requirements-e.g., laying a foundation for the admission of business
records. Good communication and understanding is required.
F. Issues With Political Overtones
Politically sensitive issues will occasionally emerge. These include
the scope of the political and military offense exceptions to the treaty, the
true meaning of the "essential public interest" exception found in some
treaties, and other possible exceptions to requests for treaty compliance
like the existence of a racial, religious, or political opinion motivation for
a prosecution. To date there has been no formal litigation on the applica-
tion of these exceptions in the context of mutual legal assistance treaties
(in large part because the United States reserves the right to assert these
exceptions to the executive branch, not to the courts), although there is
substantial litigation on the scope of the political and military offense
exceptions in extradition treaties."
3
Sensitive issues like the identification of the proper central authority
can arise if there is more than a single government agency responsible for
investigations and prosecutions." 4 The U.S. Justice Department prefers
to deal with a single entity. A particular foreign government may find
the issue sensitive domestically. Another sensitive issue might be the ap-
plicability of a treaty to a territory which is disputed with a third
country." 5
VII. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES IN AMERICAN COURTS
There have been a limited number of published opinions to date
which discuss issues relating to mutual legal assistance treaties. Most
concern the application of specific provisions or the effect of the treaty on
a person's constitutional rights.
The Second Circuit, for example, in United States v. Johnpoll,"6 re-
jected the argument that a constitutional confrontation of witnesses
problem exists when a Swiss deposition, taken pursuant to the treaty, is
112 See supra note 10.
113 See, e.g., In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1981); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
271 (1986). See also Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in
Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L LU. 61 (1979).
114 This issue arose in the U.S.-Thai negotiations. The Thai Ministries of Justice and Interior
both wished to be the Central Authority as each had separate responsibilities relevant to obtaining
evidence under Thai law. The United States rejected a Thai proposal to create two central authori-
ties. Ultimately, the Interior Ministry was designated, but only on the eve of signing.
115 An obvious example is East Jerusalem.
116 739 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1984).
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admitted in a U.S. criminal trial, provided the defendant had the oppor-
tunity to attend the deposition at government expense and failed to do
so.117 The court also rejected an argument that the treaty was violated
when the defendant was prosecuted for an offense not covered by the
treaty, provided he was also prosecuted for the offense for which the evi-
dence was obtained and there was an appropriate limiting instruction
confining the use of the evidence to the offense for which the evidence
was obtained from Switzerland." 8
In a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. Mann,"9 the
court rejected the argument of defendant taxpayer that his constitutional
right to freedom from unlawful search and seizure under the fourth
amendment was violated when documentary evidence was obtained
under the Cayman Islands Agreement in alleged violation of the Cayman
Islands bank secrecy statute. The court held the defendant had no stand-
ing to assert a fourth amendment claim based on the Cayman Islands
statute because the statute contained "exceptions" to bank secrecy there
negating any reasonable expectation of privacy. 121 The court noted the
earlier Supreme Court decision of United States v. Payner,1 21 which held
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in Bahamian bank
records because the Bahamian bank secrecy statute was "hedged with
exceptions." 122
The Mann opinion curiously overlooks the fact that one of the
clearly applicable "exceptions" to the Cayman Islands secrecy statute is
the existence of a request under the interim agreement. 123 The court sim-
ply noted that the existence of "a vast array of exceptions" within the
actual bank secrecy statute itself negates any reasonable expectation of
privacy.124
The court in Mann separately rejected the right of the defendant to
challenge the validity of the request itself, noting that the agreement did
not "establish direct, affirmative, and judicially enforceable rights" in in-
dividuals as opposed to treaty partners. 125
Despite the holding in Mann on the issue of standing, one subject
area which could pose litigation problems for the United States is alleged
117 Id. at 710.
118 Id. at 714.
119 829 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1987).
120 Id. at 852.
121 447 U.S. 727 (6th. Cir. 1980).
122 Mann, 829 F.2d at 852.
123 Narcotic Drug (Evidence) (United States of America) Law, 1984 (Law 17 of 1984) (Cay-
man Islands), especially §§ 8, 9. The court, rather than straining to hold that the existence of some
unspecified exceptions negated an expectation of privacy, should simply have pointed to these sec-
tions which explicitly negate it in this situation.
124 Mann, 829 F.2d at 852.
125 Id.
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violations of constitutional rights by foreign officials. The traditional
rule is that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is not applicable to
searches by foreign officials. However, there are two exceptions. The
first is when the activity is unconscionable and the second is when U.S.
law enforcement officials participated in the act to such an extent that an
agency relationship can be inferred.'
26
This issue was highlighted in the D.C. Circuit Court opinion in Car-
denas v. Smith, 127 a civil action for injunctive relief and damages brought
against the Attorney General, after the Swiss government froze the plain-
tiff's bank account. The United States had apparently sought assistance
in the grand jury investigation of the plaintiff's brother. The documenta-
tion submitted contained information which caused the Swiss to freeze
the plaintiff's account.
The court first rejected the argument that the plaintiff had any cause
of action based on a treaty violation itself, noting that the treaty history
made clear that private parties could not assert violations of treaty re-
strictions. 128 However, the court held the treaty did not expressly fore-
close the assertion of a violation of a U.S. constitutional or statutory
right. 29 (The court questioned whether the treaty could have validly
foreclosed judicial review of a constitutional issue relating to the use of
the treaty).13 0 The court remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine whether or not the United States had in some manner participated
in the action to freeze the plaintiff's bank accounts. If the United States
had so participated, a cause of action for damages was permissible. Sub-
sequently, the action was dismissed upon the plaintiff's motion in the
district court for reasons not relevant to the merits of the case.
The Second Circuit has recently ruled that an actual request by the
United States to the Swiss Government to freeze a defendant's bank ac-
count pursuant to article 4 of the Treaty, is not a violation of due
process.13 1
Another issue which has arisen concerns a defendant's right to con-
test the authentication procedures for documents received from abroad
pursuant to a mutual legal assistance treaty. Article 18 of the Swiss
Treaty establishes a detailed procedure for an ex parte hearing by an offi-
cial in the foreign country at which the appropriate foundational ques-
tions are asked and transcribed. A final certification is provided either by
126 See, eg., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 870
(1969); United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. Delaplane, 778
F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985).
127 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
128 Id. at 917-18.
129 Id. at 919.
130 Id.
131 Barr v. United States, 819 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1987).
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a designated foreign official or U.S. official stationed in the foreign coun-
try. A defendant then has the burden of establishing the lack of genui-
ness of such a document.
In United States v. Davis,'32 the Second Circuit rejected the defend-
ant's challenge to this procedure on the grounds that his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him had been violated. It held
that the certification procedure assured that any statement would bear
sufficient indicia of reliability to assure an adequate basis for evaluating
the truth of the declaration so there was no confrontation problem. 33 A
defendant need not, therefore, be afforded an opportunity to be present at
the authentication hearing. The Davis opinion also held that the Swiss
Treaty did not confer standing on individuals to assert noncompliance
with treaty procedures as a basis for excluding evidence. 134
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite occasional glitches, the mutual legal assistance treaties
which have already been entered into force have been faithfully imple-
mented and have proven to be extremely valuable to all the treaty part-
ners. The reason for this success has been the fact there was a basic
mutuality of interest-a strong desire on the part of both treaty partners
to obtain evidence for their own and each others' judicial proceedings
and to thwart crime.
It will be interesting to see how well the treaties work with the Ba-
hamas and Mexico, once they enter into force. Both nations are immedi-
ate neighbors of the United States. Both nations are important
transshipment points for narcotics flowing to the United States. The Ba-
hamas is a major banking center as well. Both nations have been the
subject of significant criticism by members of Congress and the media in
the past for lack of full cooperation in drug enforcement matters. Yet
both nations' leaders have pledged to cooperate with the United States in
wiping out the drug trade and stopping money laundering by providing
evidence for criminal investigations. Success in using these treaties will
constitute a significant blow to money laundering.
Regardless of what occurs in the course of implementing these two
treaties, it is already clear that mutual legal assistance treaties are the
wave of the future, if not already the present, in terms of providing
American prosecutors with the best means to secure evidence from for-
132 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985). U.S. law now establishes a procedure for authenticating
foreign records in all criminal cases. See supra note 9 accord, Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 638 F. Supp.
916 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), which also permitted a bankruptcy trustee to use documents in a civil proceed-
ing that had been obtained initially from the Swiss for a criminal trial.
133 Davis, 767 F.2d at 1031-32.
134 Id. at 1030.
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eign jurisdictions, particularly bank secrecy jurisdictions, in an admissi-
ble form. To the extent that these treaties can be negotiated and
faithftly implemented with all the major bank secrecy jurisdictions, a
major tentacle-the money tentacle-of the drug trade and organized
crime will be cut off.

